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THE QUIXOTIC QUEST FOR FAIRNESS:
THE SEC’S ROLE IN THE RISE OF HIGH
FREQUENCY TRADING
Janice Traflet
School of Management
Bucknell University
jtraflet@bucknell.edu

William R. Gruver
School of Management
Bucknell University
gruver@bucknell.edu

This paper examines the complex factors facilitating the
rise of high frequency trading (HFT) from a historical
perspective. Over the course of several decades, various
stock market regulations and reforms, championed by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), created room
for HFT to develop and flourish. While advancements in
technology initially may appear to be the primary cause of
HFT, in fact, HFT could not exist (or at least, not to the
extent it does today) if certain rules and older ways of doing
business on the exchanges were still in place, and if other
regulations did not support its existence. This paper
identifies multiple factors contributing to the eventual rise
of HFT: decimalization, the decline of the specialist system,
market fragmentation, rate deregulation, the repeal of the
uptick rule, demutualization of the stock exchanges, and the
institution of Regulation National Market System [NMS].
Moreover, it seeks to position these developments within the
broader context of long-standing aims and themes
embraced by the SEC.
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Introduction
Detailing the stunning rise of high frequency trading (HFT) in his
2014 best-seller Flash Boys, Michael Lewis argues that high frequency
traders have rigged the stock market to the disadvantage of many retail
and institutional investors.1 Making a similar contention in their own
book, Broken Markets, Sal Arnuk and Joseph Saluzzi (2012) lament that
markets are “broken” due in part to the rapid proliferation of HFT. Such
criticisms have helped spark widespread debate about the effects and
legitimacy of HFT, as well as its causes. 2 At first glance, advancements
in technology may appear to be the primary cause of HFT, but
technological innovation does not happen in a vacuum; often, it is a
response to market opportunities. Lewis, Arnuk, and Saluzzi all trace the
genesis of HFT to changes in market structure driven by the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC), and they focus on developments that
have occurred roughly over the past fifteen years. 3 Indeed, various
market reforms championed by the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) over many decades created room for HFT to develop and flourish.
This essay explores those factors that facilitated and contributed to the
rise of HFT from a broad historical perspective. HFT could not exist (or
at least, not to the extent it does today) if certain rules and older ways of
doing business on the exchanges were still in place, and if other
regulations did not support its existence. This paper delves into
decimalization, the decline of the specialist system, market
fragmentation, rate deregulation, the repeal of the uptick rule,
demutualization of the stock exchanges, and the institution of Regulation
National Market System [NMS] as key factors that facilitated the
eventual rise of HFT. 4 Moreover, it seeks to position these developments
within the broader context of long-standing aims and themes embraced
by the SEC. First, however, it is necessary to explore the concept of high
frequency trading, and define this practice.
High Frequency Trading Defined
Problematically, high frequency trading has been inconsistently
defined by the popular press, academics, and even its practitioners. 5 As
Andrew Kumiega at Infinium Capital Management once remarked,
“High-frequency trading means everything to everyone.” 6 The resulting
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haziness surrounding the concept adds to confusion about HFT’s
legitimacy as well as its root causes. It is important, therefore, to
articulate clearly what is HFT (and what is not HFT). High frequency
trading is neither synonymous with electronic trading nor algorithmic
trading, although it utilizes both. Electronic trading involves placing buy
and sell orders for stocks or other financial products over a computer
network, typically via a broker or a stock exchange. Algorithmic trading
(sometimes dubbed “algo trading” or “automated trading”) goes one step
further, using electronic platforms to input trading orders that depend on
algorithms.7 Algorithms contain pre-programmed and hence automatic
trading instructions, such as when to buy or sell a stock, how many
shares, and at what price. Algorithmic trading utilizes program trading,
which grew alongside the rise in electronic communication networks
(ECNs). Electronic exchanges such as Instinet and Archipelago
Exchange enabled the ultra quick matching of myriad buy and sell
orders, all via computer, all absent the human touch. 8
High-frequency trading (HFT) typically involves fast algorithmic,
automated electronic trading that relies on information that is obtained
electronically to make order decisions. Yet HFT entails more than this.
Speed, as measured by latency, is a hallmark of high-frequency trading.9
However, the “F” in “HFT” does not stand for “FAST”; it stands for
“FREQUENCY”, as HFT darts in-and-out of positions often within
milliseconds to take advantage of tiny arbitrage opportunities across
exchanges. HFT relies on heavy trading volume--frequency of trades--to
profit from these small differentials. 10
Finally, as will be explained, HFT also often involves traders being
able to glimpse other market orders – to have a valuable look or sneak
peek at order flow before they place their own orders. 11 That look
(combined with the speed to act upon it and the frequency to do so)
substantially enhances the likelihood of high frequency traders making
profits. The more advance a look at order flow an HFT firm enjoys, the
more likely it is to outshine its competitors’ performances, including that
of other HFT firms.
In acquiring a millisecond or microsecond information advantage
over other traders, computing speed is a key asset, as is “co-location”
near an exchange’s computers. Testifying before Congress in June 2014,
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Senator John McCain described co-location as a “key tactic used by
high-frequency trading firms.” He explained, “This practice involves
trading firms literally renting space for their computers in the same room
as the computers that run the stock exchanges so that they can receive
market information directly from the exchanges’ computers as fast as
possible.” 12 Close physical proximity to an exchange’s computers is one
way to reduce impedance by shaving milliseconds off the time it takes
data transmission lines to relay critical order information. 13
In addition to relying on co-location, HFT firms 14 also try to peek
into exchanges and detect orders as they initiate from a broker’s order
router. HFT firms often place small orders (which they sometime cancel)
to try to flesh out buying or selling pressure, perhaps particularly from
those wanting to move large, block orders.
By whatever means they obtain the look or sneak peek at order flow
(or even potential order flow), the ability of HFT firms to access and act
upon valuable knowledge in advance of other market participants
potentially could disadvantage other traders. As Georgetown scholars
James Angel and Douglas McCabe (2013, p. 589) explain, “So-called
‘predatory’ algorithms, or ‘algos,’ figure out that a large order is in the
process of execution and jump in front of it.” While Angel and McCabe
view this as one of HFT’s “predictive strategies,” critics allege that HFT
(or, more precisely, the look aspect of HFT) is a form of front-running.15
Generally, front running involves someone who is privy to order
flow knowledge and then acts upon it for his or her own profit by
jumping ahead of customers to trade (buy or sell) for his or her own
account.16 Front-running in most cases is illegal, as it confers an unfair
advantage to the person who engages in the practice. 17 Although some
are quick to deride HFT as front-running,18 Angel and McCabe are more
circumspect, noting, “While it is clear that brokers who front run their
own customers are violating their ethical duties to their customers, it is
not clear that there is anything wrong with investors using information
that is publicly available to everyone to make their trading decisions.”
Yet, as they note, there is the complicating factor that “some investors
have access to faster computers than others.” 19
Seeing things more black and white, Michael Lewis has sharply
criticized HFT, blaming it for devolving the U.S. stock market into “a
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class system, rooted in speed, of haves and have-nots. The haves paid
for nanoseconds; the have-nots had no idea that a nanosecond had value.
The haves enjoyed a perfect view of the market; the have-nots never saw
the market at all.” Lewis laments, “What had once been the world’s
most public, most democratic, financial market had become, in spirit,
something more like a private viewing of a stolen work of art.” 20 Lewis’
incendiary charges of a rigged stock market have heightened pressure on
the SEC (that already had been investigating HFT) to issue new
regulations to eliminate, or at least mitigate, the practice.
Before regulators rush to fix the perceived problem of HFT,
however, it is worthwhile to examine closely the true root causes of HFT
in order to form effective solutions, if solutions are indeed needed. In
ferreting out the underlying causes of HFT, it becomes clear that the SEC
in many ways and over several decades ironically helped create an
environment conducive to HFT, the very practice it now seeks to curb.
Before discussing some of the specific actions that ultimately catalyzed
HFT, it is helpful to understand the original intentions underlying the
SEC’s creation in 1934, and certain assumptions that have long guided
the SEC. As will be seen, the SEC, in its quest to make markets a better
place for small, ordinary investors, actually wound up fostering an HFTfriendly environment.
Creation of the SEC and Core Assumptions Guiding Its Actions
Over the Years
On June 6, 1934, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed into law the
Securities and Exchange Act, which momentously brought the nation’s
stock exchanges under federal regulation. 21 The SEC’s mission has been
“to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and
facilitate capital formation.”22 Notably, the NYSE historically also has
placed enormous importance on ensuring “fair and orderly” markets. 23
Yet arguably, the NYSE considered “fair” and “orderly” to be closer to
synonymous than did the SEC. The NYSE interpreted a “fair and
orderly” market in part to mean one that did not wildly fluctuate. Like
the SEC, the NYSE also had a notion that fairness meant making sure
that small and big investors alike had equal opportunity to achieve
investing success. The SEC’s notion of fairness led to the agency
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championing various market reforms, many of which yielded positive
impacts, but sometimes also led to largely unforeseen consequences such
as HFT.
The very creation of the SEC stemmed from the perceived need to
correct unfairness in the markets and the belief by some that the NYSE
and other exchanges were not up to the task of doing so themselves. The
legislation emanated from more than three years of Congressional
investigations into stock market practices following the devastating Great
Crash of 1929. Frustrated that the NYSE too often seemed to look the
other way when it came to stock manipulations such as pools 24, critics of
Wall Street contended that the NYSE and other stock exchanges needed
to be brought under external control to ensure fairness. A compromise
between government reformers and moderate factions on Wall Street, the
Securities and Exchange Act, though, left the exchanges as primarily
self-regulatory organizations (SROs). The Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), created in section 4 of the Act, was only supposed to
act when self-regulation failed. The drafters of the legislation 25 intended
that the SEC would help protect investors if the exchanges failed to act
on their own. They also hoped that the very existence of a cop on the
corner of Wall Street (in the form of the SEC) would inspire greater
public trust in the integrity of the markets.
Despite the compromises embedded in the Act, some members of the
Wall Street community expressed deep concern about its passage. Old
Guard leaders of the NYSE, such as Charles Gay and Richard Whitney,
lamented the loss of their organization’s complete independence and
contended that outsiders could not effectively even co-regulate the
securities markets due to their lack of understanding of the complex
operations underlying the exchanges. 26 They worried that any SEC
meddling—even with benign intentions related to the agency’s fairness
mission—might unleash a bevy of negative, unintended consequences.
Even though President Roosevelt appointed Joseph P. Kennedy, 27 a
former trader himself, to be the first head of the SEC, the Exchange’s
conservative wing remained suspicious that the SEC intended to take
away the NYSE’s historic power over its own house.
Kennedy’s next two successors as SEC chairman (who were
attorneys, not former market professionals) – James Landis (1935-1937)
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and William O. Douglas (1937-1939) – vocally supported the idea that
the securities industries should mostly be self-regulated, albeit subject to
SEC supervision. 28 As Landis reassured Wall Street at a meeting of the
New York Stock Exchange Institute in the summer of 1935, “Selfgovernment is, of course, the desirable thing. Everyone will admit that
the less regulation there is, the better it will be, provided the objectives
are always kept clear; and the better the self-government, the less need
there is for regulation.” 29 Also adamant that the SEC should intervene
only if and when self-regulation failed, William O. Douglas once
explained that the idea was to “keep the shotgun, so to speak, behind the
door, loaded, well-oiled, cleaned, ready for use, but with the hope that it
would never have to be used.” 30
Feeling the threat of SEC intervention looming over them and
anxious to avoid it, the NYSE in the Great Depression years worked to
make markets more fair, in part by having its Business Conduct
Committee more aggressively patrol the Exchange floor and root out
such obviously detrimental practices such as pools and corners by which
insiders tried to manipulate stocks.
The NYSE and the SEC
harmoniously agreed about the need to eradicate certain practices. Yet
on larger market structure issues and how they might be modified to
make markets more fair, the SEC often perceived matters differently than
the NYSE, even after the Exchange underwent a pivotal internal
reorganization in 1938. While the SEC’s leadership has changed hands
many times since 1934, analyzing certain overarching themes in the
SEC’s attitude and approach to the NYSE over the years can yield
insights into what the SEC believes will make the markets more fair.
First, the SEC long has held that markets would be fairer if they were
more fragmented. For most of the NYSE’s existence, the NYSE was by
far the largest exchange in the country and the world, handling the vast
majority of stock trades. The NYSE defensively argued that it was a
natural monopoly, and hence such concentration was in the best interests
of investors and the Exchange alike. Yet the SEC feared the NYSE’s
dominant market share, concerned that such a concentration meant
higher order execution prices for investors as well as other problems.
Second, the SEC, particularly in the last half century, has had faith in the
power of technology to make markets more democratic, in part because
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technology could presumably reduce transaction costs. Third, as will be
discussed, the SEC believed markets would be fairer if floor traders 31 and
specialists32 exerted less influence (or were abolished altogether). In
fact, in the original draft of the Securities Act of 1934, Section 10 of the
proposed bill would have ended the role of floor traders and would have
removed specialists’ ability to trade for their own accounts. 33
As will be detailed, in time the SEC largely got the environment it
sought–a considerably weakened NYSE, a diminished role for
specialists, enhanced technology and a reduced human factor, and much
cheaper commission costs for both retail and institutional investors. Yet
the SEC also got—for better or for worse—HFT. Understanding how
certain SEC initiatives helped foster HFT requires carefully examining
pivotal developments such as decimalization, the end to fixed
commission rates, the repeal of the uptick rule, and the institution of
Regulation NMS. More broadly, beyond better understanding the rise of
HFT, an analysis of these developments illuminates how an increasingly
activist SEC has helped shape modern securities markets and how the
SEC’s original notion of largely maintaining the NYSE’s historic SRO
status has withered away as the SEC has aggressively pursued its own
ideas of how to bring more fairness to U.S. equity markets. In the
process, the NYSE’s fundamental nature has been transformed, along
with the investing landscape.
The NYSE as an Auction Market and The Specialist System
For more than two centuries, the NYSE had been an auction market,
until recently when it became a more hybrid model. In the case of an
auction market (as opposed to a dealer’s market in which those wishing
to buy and sell have to go through a dealer), the highest bidding price for
a stock is matched against the lowest asking price. 34 At the NYSE for
more than a century, it was the job of the specialist in his agency role to
bring together buyers and sellers, thereby facilitating trades. For most of
the NYSE’s history, every trade used to have to go through a specialist.
Specialists, therefore, occupied a unique position on the NYSE floor. In
recent years, however, the power of the specialists has been vastly
diminished.35 Understanding the historical role played by the specialists
enables one to appreciate how this system, if left intact, might have
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served as a balance to the otherwise largely unchecked influence of HFT.
The position of NYSE specialist dates back to 1871. In that year the
NYSE moved to continuous trading in stocks and away from the prior
system (in place since 1792) of daily call auctions in individual stocks.
Initially, brokers were overwhelmed by the challenges posed by
continual, simultaneous trading of stocks; they had been accustomed to
being able to monitor every stock as it traded. Soon, however, some
floor brokers stumbled upon a solution: they could profitably specialize
in working orders for a particular stock from a stationary post on the
exchange floor. The specialist position thus developed. 36
Throughout the twentieth century, the NYSE vigorously defended
the specialist position as necessary and beneficial to investors and the
market as a whole. While critics pointed to the specialist’s privileged
position on the floor, the NYSE emphasized that in return for the
advantages associated with that position, the specialist had a
responsibility to provide a “fair and orderly market,” which included
being compelled to trade, if circumstances necessitated, against his
firm’s financial interest. This could entail injecting much-needed
liquidity into stocks during tumultuous times by committing his firm’s
capital.37 While the concept of a “fair and orderly market” has never
been strictly defined, the NYSE historically interpreted it to mean, in
part, a market that does not gyrate hugely. The specialist was supposed
to act to stabilize prices, provide capital if needed, and facilitate order
executions for other members. 38 As the NYSE once explained, “To
ensure that stock trading moves smoothly, with minimal price
fluctuation, the specialist will step in against the market trend.
Specialists buy and sell stock to cushion temporary imbalances and to
avoid unreasonable price variations.” The NYSE added, “As a dealer, the
specialist will buy or sell stock from his own inventory to keep the
market liquid or to prevent rapid price changes.” 39 In a sense, specialists
controlled the order flow, as they continually made judgment calls about
who got to participate in trades and in what order. 40
Deeming liquidity to be “one of the most important characteristics of
a good market,” the NYSE has defined liquidity as “depth of market to
absorb buy and sell interest of even large orders at prices appropriate to
supply and demand.”41 To the NYSE, liquidity and market fairness are
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intertwined concepts. Because specialists enhanced liquidity, specialists,
according to the traditional NYSE argument, did much to make markets
more orderly. 42
The NYSE, however, conceded that there were some abuses of the
specialist system at various junctures. Unfortunately, as Ferdinand
Pecora had uncovered, some specialists in the 1920s had exploited their
roles by arranging profitable pools in the very stocks in which they were
making markets, such as trader Michael Meehan had done with Radio
Corporation of America (RCA). Agreeing with critics that such episodes
should be prevented from reoccurring, the NYSE Governing Committee
in 1934 banned members from participating in stock pools, proscribed
specialists from “disclosing to any person, other than certain committees
of the Exchange, any information in regard to orders entrusted to
[them],” and also prohibited specialists “from acquiring or granting any
option in the stocks in which they specialize.” 43
In enacting these rules to more tightly govern the specialist system,
the NYSE also hoped to prove that the NYSE indeed was capable of selfregulation, and that some type of national securities legislation was
therefore unnecessary. That same year, however, the Securities and
Exchange Act created the SEC. Critics of the NYSE demanded an end to
the specialist function on the exchanges, 44 but the SEC at the time did not
heed their calls, fearing the potential consequences of such a drastic
change in stock market operations.
In subsequent decades, however, criticisms of the specialist system
continued to surface. Notably, a Special Study of the Securities Markets
in 1963 expressed concern about certain stock market practices, such as
the freedom with which specialists seemed to act. 45 Other studies found
that during periods of crisis (like the assassination of President Kennedy
on November 12, 1963), the specialist system did not always stabilize the
market in the way it was intended, because certain specialists sometimes
acted to protect their own interests or were inadequately capitalized and,
thus, were simply overwhelmed by disproportionate volume on one side
of the market. Similar to what transpired after the Pecora Investigation
in the 1930s, the NYSE’s Board of Governors in 1964 modified and
expanded its own rules concerning the specialists, in an effort to thwart
additional SEC involvement. The NYSE instituted several procedural
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changes, such as more detailed policies concerning liquidation of
positions.46 The NYSE President at the time, Keith Funston, along with
Chairman of the Board Henry Watts, were quick to emphasize, however,
that these revised procedures did not alter the core of the specialist
system—nor should it, since the specialist system was designed so as to
maintain a healthy auction market for securities. 47
Despite enduring criticisms, the specialist system remained basically
unaltered until the 21st century when, as will be discussed, certain
developments occurred that catalyzed action. 48 By that time, other
transformations of the securities markets already had taken place such as
rate deregulation, the creation of a national market system,
demutualization of the exchanges, the enactment of Regulation NMS,
and the repeal of the uptick rule. All of this created a “perfect storm” of
sorts.49 Once the technology became available and once entrepreneurs
imaginatively envisioned the possibilities of exploiting nearly de minimis
arbitrage opportunities through extensive rapid trading, HFT could
develop with few roadblocks in the way of its growth.
Rate Deregulation and the Creation of a National Market System
(1975)
In the 1960s and 1970s, the SEC focused on the need to lower
trading costs for investors and relatedly, the necessity of encouraging
more broker competition. In the aftermath of the 1963 Special Study, the
SEC in 1968 mandated the end of minimum, fixed commission rates on
all US stock exchanges—a practice that had been in place at the NYSE
since its founding in 1792. 50 The NYSE for a time fought the move to
negotiated rates, but eventually capitulated. Exchange President Robert
Haack gradually came to the conclusion that fixed rates were actually
harming the NYSE, causing the organization to lose too much business
to cheaper competitors and fostering “inept management” at several
member brokerage firms. 51 While Haack was expressing his personal
views, eventually the NYSE Board also became convinced of the need to
jettison fixed rates and the futility of fighting the SEC on the issue.
By May 1975, the move to negotiated rates was fully implemented.
While much has been written about “May Day 1975” and the subsequent
rise of discount brokerage firms, 52 the long-term impacts of rate
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deregulation still are not well understood. For example, it is not well
appreciated how the resulting revenue loss impelled member firms to
embrace more heavily a higher risk activity, proprietary trading (i.e.,
trading solely for their own gain), in an attempt to replace the lost
revenue from their traditional brokerage and block trading operations
(i.e., facilitating customer trades to earn commissions and buy/sell
spreads).53 Prior to 1975, proprietary trading on the part of member
firms was extremely limited. Inspired by May Day to brainstorm about
potential alternative revenue streams, some member firms such as
Goldman Sachs honed in on the idea of expanding their small arbitrage
desks into what later became known as algo trading. Trading algorithms
that today are at the heart of successful HFTs were first used in the 1980s
and 1990s amidst these expanding proprietary trading operations.
In the same year as rate deregulation, Congress passed the Securities
Acts Amendments of 1975, also known as the National Exchange Market
System Act. It amended Section 11A of the Securities Exchange Act of
193454, which mandated that the SEC propel forward the creation of a
national market system (NMS) — which would “link together the
multiple individual markets that trade securities.” As the SEC recounts,
“Congress intended the Commission [through Section 11A] to take
advantage of opportunities created by new data processing and
communication technologies to preserve and strengthen the securities
markets.” According to the SEC, the NMS was “designed to achieve the
objectives of efficient, competitive, fair and orderly markets that are in
the public interest and protect investors.”55
The creation of a national market system enables thousands of listed
stocks today to be (in the words of the SEC) “traded simultaneously at a
variety of different venues that participate in the NMS, including
national securities exchanges, alternative trading systems [ATSs]…, and
market-making securities dealers.” 56 The creation of the NMS was also
an attempt to reduce the power of the NYSE, in part by fragmenting the
market and inspiring the creation of many new stock exchanges. This
fragmentation, in turn, created arbitrage opportunities from what at first
seemed to be insignificant price differentials between the multiple
markets.
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At the time of the creation of the national market system in the
1970s, the NYSE still was indisputably the most powerful exchange in
the country, boasting the highest market share. Congress and the SEC,
concerned that such market concentration was not in the best interests of
investors, contemplated effective ways to diffuse that power, hoping that
doing so would make the markets more fair. Both the SEC and Congress
possessed great faith that if only the equity markets would tap into newly
available data processing and communications technologies, they could
become much more competitive, efficient and fair than if the exchanges
continued to rely on human judgment to facilitate trades.
In the ensuing decades since 1975, the Commission, endeavoring to
keep abreast of evolving market conditions (some of which the SEC’s
actions bred), periodically has revised the rules governing the national
market system. As will be explored, Regulation NMS, first proposed in
2004 and then approved in 2005, is part of that long history. 57
First, however, it is important to examine how another landmark
transition prodded by the SEC, the decimalization of stock prices, further
reduced the profitability of member firms. This propelled some firms to
embrace riskier activities in order to compensate for the reduced revenue
stream.
Decimalization of Stock Prices (2001) and the Repeal of the Uptick
Rule (2007)
In 2001, the NYSE adopted the practice of quoting stocks in
decimals, meaning pennies, rather than fractions. As CNBC senior editor
John Carney recalled, “Beginning in the 1990s, the SEC began a
campaign to undermine the old [fractional] system.” 58 In a 1994 report,
the SEC staff blamed the then-current dollar tick size of 1/8th for
“caus[ing] artificially wide spreads and hinder[ing] price competition”
and in the process, engendering excessive profits for market makers. 59
Reducing the tick size and changing to decimal pricing, contended
advocates like Arthur Levitt (SEC Chairman, 1993-2001), would help
investors by resulting in smaller spreads on trades. 60 This might benefit
especially small retail investors, since large institutions were already able
to get better net prices by negotiating commission rates on block trades.
According to SEC Commissioner Steve Wallman, if the NYSE and other
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exchanges were forced to reduce their minimum tick size, decimalization
would save retail investors roughly $1.5 billion a year. 61 The idea was
that “smaller trading increments would intensify competition among all
sorts of limit order traders. Market makers, day-traders, hedge funds,
and arbitrageurs would all try to better each other’s quotes, leading to
price improvement for the customer,” as Peter Chapman at Traders
Magazine explained in a 1999 cover story on pending decimalization. 62
Average investors might also find stock prices quoted in dollars and
cents easier to understand than if they were quoted in fractions.
Converting to decimals, therefore, purportedly would make markets
more fair. The SEC also believed that decimalization would make
markets more fair by impeding market makers from making so much
money on the spreads.
Many also derided fractional pricing as anachronistic, and indeed,
the practice dated back to the 17th century colonial custom of using
Spanish coins, which were called “pieces of eight” because they could be
broken into eight “bit” pieces. As Representative Michael Oxley, an
ardent proponent of decimalization, complained in 1997, “When
organized stock trading began in New York in 1792, stock prices were
quoted in bits, or eighths. We don't use Spanish coins today--but the
tradition of pricing stocks based on these coins is still with us, in the
form of SRO rules.”63 Advocates of decimalization further noted that in
many exchanges in other countries, decimalization was already the
standard practice. As SEC Chairman Levitt said, “The U.S. securities
markets must adopt the international convention of decimal pricing in
order to remain competitive.”64
Consequently, in March 1997, Representatives Michael Oxley (ROhio) and Edward Markey (D-Mass) introduced HR 1053, the “Common
Cents Stock Pricing Act,” which sought to require decimalization as soon
as the SEC could make it possible. The purpose of the proposed Act was
“To amend the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to eliminate legal
impediments to quotation in decimals for securities transactions in order
to protect investors and to promote efficiency, competition, and capital
formation.”65 As Oxley contended, “A modern decimal system is better
for small investors…People are being eighth-ed and sixteenth-ed right
out of their stock profits.” 66 As Oxley further explained, “The Common
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Cents Stock Pricing Act will eliminate regulatory obstacles that stand in
the way of competitive forces.”67 Seeing the handwriting on the wall, the
NYSE just three months after the introduction of HR 1053 voted to shift
to decimals, and other exchanges like Nasdaq soon did so as well. As a
result, Oxley and Markey withdrew the bill, which never was enacted. 68
The SEC continued to play a large role in propelling the adoption of
decimal pricing, ordering the NYSE and other exchanges to submit
phase-in plans outlining how and when they were going to implement the
necessary rule changes.
With the SEC watching with approval, the exchanges converted to
decimals in calculated stages, with the NYSE first reducing its minimum
tick size from one-eighth to one-sixteenth. By April 2001, in compliance
with the SEC’s mandate, all the exchanges had completed their shift to
decimalization, and stocks therefore now moved in increments of
pennies.69 Decimalization struck another blow to the profitability of
traditional Wall Street block trading desks 70 and furthered the importance
of both proprietary trading and automation of trading – the two
ingredients of HFTs.
More than a decade since the implementation of decimal pricing,
there is still strong debate about its effects and whether the benefits
exceeded the costs. 71 As Greg Ghodsi of Raymond James contended in
2009, “…decimalization is a negative because it narrowed the spreads.
On the surface you would think it would be better for the markets but
narrower spreads mean less profit for market makers. Less profit leads
to less capital and less capital leads to less liquidity [and more
volatility].”72 Concurring, Jeffrey Rubin, head of research at Birinyi
Associates, bluntly stated, “There is a direct correlation to the decrease in
market making profits and the increase in proprietary trading at the likes
of GS [Goldman Sachs], C [Chase], MER [Merrill Lynch], etc.” 73
Decimalization may have indirectly made it easier for HFT to
proliferate in that perhaps people do not notice or mind as much giving
up a piece of their trade if it is a small enough piece. Decimalization also
affected HFT by impacting the fate of the uptick rule (also known as the
“plus tick” rule).
The SEC had designed the uptick rule to reduce short-selling on the
NYSE—and in the process, slow down a potential slide in a stock.
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Instituted in 1938 during the heart of the Great Depression, the uptick
rule (SEC Rule 10a-1) put restrictions on short-sellers, depending on the
direction of the “tick” of the stock. A tick has been defined as “the
change in the price of a security from trade to trade.” 74 According to the
uptick rule, if a stock were trading at a minus tick (a price below the last
sale price) or a zero-minus tick (an unchanged price from the prior minus
tick trade), one could not sell the stock short until it experienced a plus
tick—a trade occurring at a higher price than the previous price. 75 The
rule was intended in part to assuage concerns about potential bear raids
on a stock. (Despite lacking evidence, some in the late 1930s continued
to blame bear raiding for exacerbating the Great Crash of 1929.)
In the 1980s, program traders (as early electronic algo traders were
called) and other constituents began to lobby to have the uptick rule
repealed, arguing that the complexity of modern markets had made the
rule out-of-date.76 It was the conversion to decimal pricing in 2001 that
put the nail in the coffin of the rule; to many observers, decimalization
diluted the value of the rule to almost nothing, because a penny uptick
might be “just too small an increment to stop the short.” 77 As Christopher
Cox (SEC Chairman, 2005-2009) contended, “When a stock is dropping
like a stone it tends to drop with…penny upticks along the way.” 78
Viewed as no longer effective, the uptick rule was repealed on July
6, 2007 with little debate. Interestingly, the question arises whether the
repeal helped HFT flourish. Buy-side HFT is only a piece of the
equation. The other is selling. For HFT traders who were endeavoring
to jump ahead of another sell order, whether or not the uptick rule was in
effect had no impact upon them if they were selling “long” (i.e., owning
the stock they were intending to sell). If, however, HFT traders were
intending to sell short (selling stock they had borrowed or did not own),
now, after the repeal, they, like other short sellers, were no longer
encumbered by any tick constraints; they could “hit the bid” (sell) on a
negative tick, plus tick, or zero tick. Previously, if HFT traders were
trying to front-run a sell order, and it was a minus-tick, they could not
sell if they were shorting that stock; they would have to wait for the plus
tick.
On February 24, 2010, roughly three years after the repeal of the
uptick rule, the SEC adopted Rule 201, which the SEC described as an
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“alternate uptick rule.” As the SEC noted, the new rule “imposes
restrictions on short selling only when a stock has triggered a circuit
breaker by experiencing a price decline of at least 10 percent in one day.
At that point, short selling would be permitted if the price of the security
is above the current national best bid.” 79 This, however, is a far cry from
the original uptick rule.
Demutualization of the NYSE
Meanwhile, in 2006, the NYSE ceased being a not-for-profit
organization. Shortly after converting to for-profit status, the exchange
ceased being owned entirely by its members and became a publicly
traded corporation. Either of these changes was momentous in its own
right; together they represented a sea change. For most of the twentieth
century, the SEC had criticized the NYSE for being the equivalent of a
“private club,” with members, who owned “seats” on the exchange,
largely making their own rules. Since 1934, the NYSE was not free from
external regulatory oversight, but Exchange leaders long resisted
fundamentally changing the organization’s not-for-profit structure.
By the late 1990s and early 21st century, however, the two biggest
exchanges (NYSE and NASDAQ) were in weak positions, in part due to
scandals rocking them (first, a market maker quote-rigging scandal at the
NASDAQ and then, in 2003, a specialist scandal at the NYSE—along
with controversy surrounding the pay package awarded to the NYSE’s
President at the time, Richard Grasso.) 80 As R.T. Leuchtkafer has
explained, in response to the quote-rigging scandal, “NASDAQ and its
parent company the National Association of Securities Dealers (now
called the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, or FINRA) were
forced to implement changes allowing electronic communication
networks (ECNs) into the market.” According to reformers’ rationale,
“…if market makers were cheating their investor customers, then
investors should just trade directly with one another, bypassing the
market makers altogether [through ECNs].” 81 This opened the door,
however, to HFT “scalpers”.82 The exchanges also were vulnerable
because they were feeling the effects of SEC-driven rule changes that
facilitated competitors at electronic venues acquiring market share. As
Arnuk and Saluzzi explain, NASDAQ and the NYSE eventually became
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“publicly traded companies to access much needed capital to compete
with the plethora of lightning-fast electronic trading venues.”83 But first,
they decided to demutualize.
As Jennifer Elliott at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) once
explained, demutualization describes “the transition from a mutual
association of exchange members operating on a not-for-profit basis to a
limited liability, for-profit company, accountable to shareholders.” 84
Importantly, the SEC, anxious to rely more on technology than the hands
of the specialists and market makers, became proponents of the idea of
for-profit exchanges.85 With the SEC’s support, NASDAQ converted to
a for-profit corporation in 2000. The NYSE, after resisting the trend,
capitulated in 2006, after Richard Grasso (NYSE CEO, 1995-2003)
stepped down and John Thain, former Goldman Sachs President and Cochief Operating Officer, succeeded him as CEO of the NYSE. The
NYSE went public as part of the process of acquiring Archipelago
Exchange (“ArcaEx”).
The fusion of Archipelago Electronic
Communications Network (a pioneer ECN) and the Pacific Exchange,
ArcaEx had gone public in 2004, becoming the country’s first
completely electronic exchange. 86
The move to a for-profit corporation drastically changed the NYSE
in many ways. With enhanced access to capital, the NYSE (like
NASDAQ) now possessed the means to invest more robustly in
technology and data centers. 87 But the fact that the NYSE now was forprofit also introduced new, potential conflicts of interests; some of which
may have affected the NYSE’s ability to critically evaluate the
opportunities and dangers presented by HFT. As will be discussed, the
NYSE discovered that the organization could make money from HFT.
The Enactment of Regulation NMS
Meanwhile, the SEC had adopted a series of rules in 2005 called
Regulation NMS (National Market System) that went into effect in
2007.88 Flash Boys author Michael Lewis blames “Reg NMS” for
causing HFT to proliferate, although as this paper discusses, HFT also
had a host of other triggers. Reg NMS was the SEC’s effort to further
shape the national market system, which it had created in 1975. As
Lewis notes, Reg NMS held brokers to a new, seemingly higher standard
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for fulfilling customer orders, as they now were compelled by law to find
the “best price” for their customers, rather than the prior standard of
“best execution.” Lewis acknowledges that “Like a lot of regulations,
Reg NMS was well-meaning….” 89 Yet he also shows how and why it
went awry. After Reg NMS’ implementation, high-frequency traders
could now much better predict the exchange(s) to which brokers would
route their clients’ orders, because they knew that brokers had to obtain
that best market price which was determined by a system known as the
National Best Bid and Offer (NBBO).90 A relatively slow computer
program, the Securities Information Processor (SIP), calculated the
NBBO. Realizing this, high-frequency traders seeking a competitive
advantage soon tapped into far more sophisticated technology to create
their own, faster algorithm of a best-price calculator. 91 Lewis explains
the results: “Reg NMS was intended to create equality of opportunity in
the U.S. stock market. Instead it institutionalized a more pernicious
inequality. A small class of insiders with the resources to create speed
were now allowed to preview the market and trade on what they had
seen.” 92
Moreover, Reg NMS indirectly spawned the rise of dark pools, a
private stock crossing mechanism owned and operated by a brokerage
firm or firms whose operations are visible only to those running it. 93
Some firms marketed their dark pools as a way to hide large trades from
the machinations of predatory high frequency traders. Yet the lack of
transparency inherent in dark pools often served the purposes of the very
flash traders the pools were ostensibly designed to avoid, as HFT firms
sometimes succeeded in buying the right to operate inside them. 94 In the
sense, SEC regulations resulted in the look being transferred from the
specialists of old to the HFT firms who have no public responsibility.
Regulators had believed this rule would make the markets fairer by
clamping down on any possible front-running of orders on the
exchanges. As previously discussed, front-running occurs when a trader
puts his own order or his firm’s order ahead of his customer’s, and it is
illegal if the order information used is not also available to the public. 95
Beginning in 2003, as Lewis recounts, the SEC investigated several
specialists at the NYSE, accusing them of front-running orders, charges
that were eventually settled only after the traders paid hefty fines. 96 Reg

162
Essays in Economic & Business History Volume XXXIII, 2015

Traflet and Gruver
NMS was designed in part to curb such potential front-running by
specialists but ironically, it created a situation ripe for a new form of
what some call front-running, in the guise of flash trading.
Transforming Specialists into Designated Market Makers
Meanwhile, in 2008, the NYSE, in consultation with the SEC,
instituted some changes to its membership classes, morphing the position
of specialists into “designated market makers,” or DMMs. 97 In October
2008, as the NYSE relates, the SEC “approve[d] the [NYSE’s] nextgeneration market model…, under which DMMs have accountability for
providing liquidity, better access to capital and risk-management
capabilities, and are on an even playing field with other market
participants in terms of trading parity and access to information.” The
NYSE noted that DMMs, like the specialists of old, retained “the
obligation to maintain an orderly market in their stocks” (although one
may wonder how they could effectively do so if they now are on parity
with other traders). DMMs also needed to “quote at the national best bid
or offer a specified percentage of the time, and facilitate price discovery
at the open, close and in periods of significant imbalances.” 98 At the
same time as the creation of DMMs, the NYSE also introduced the
position of Supplemental Liquidity Providers or SLPs, who constituted
“a new class of upstairs, electronic, high-volume members…with
incentives to add liquidity on the NYSE.” 99 SLPs formalized the role of
Goldman Sachs and other upstairs trading desks that since the 1960s had
been supplementing and filling the void of the undercapitalized
specialists. Combined with profit margins under continuous regulatory
pressure, the additions of PhD-developed trading algorithms for
proprietary desks and the advent of computerization, these upstairs
proprietary trading desks were the forefathers of HFT.
By the end of the first decade of the 21st century, the specialist
system that had been at the heart of the NYSE’s auction market was
dying a slow death. Decimalization, implemented in 2001, enormously
hurt specialists’ ability to make profits, and then subsequent events
continued to weaken the specialists’ position. The human element on the
NYSE was no longer what it had once been.
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As Michael Lewis points out, “Over the past decade, the financial
markets have changed too rapidly for our mental picture of them to
remain true to life.” He contends that most people still possess an image
of the markets in which “a ticker tape runs across the bottom of some
cable TV screen, and alpha males in color-coded jackets stand in trading
pits, hollering at each other.” Lewis argues, “That picture is dated; the
world it depicts is dead.” 100 As Lewis himself acknowledges, there are,
of course, still some humans on the floor of the NYSE, but his broader
point is correct concerning the automation of trading. This is the
scenario that a host of securities regulators, over decades, worked to
create, as they simultaneously labored to dismantle the power of the
specialist system.
Flash Crash of 2010; “The Crash of 2:45 pm”
On May 6, 2010, a “flash crash” jolted traders, catching them offguard especially with regard to the speed and intensity with which it
unfolded.101 During that crash, which was also called “The Crash of 2:45
pm”, the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) plunged 600 points in the
span of just five minutes—a historic fall in such a compressed time
period. Then, however, equally surprisingly, the DJIA rapidly recovered
most of that loss by 3:07 pm. Such extreme intraday volatility stands in
contrast to the type of “fair and orderly” market that the NYSE has
hailed as critical to maintain. Initial theories varied regarding what
caused the mysterious crash. High frequency trading was considered as a
possible factor—if not in causing the Crash, at least, in accelerating the
market decline. 102
The SEC, in conjunction with the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC), examined the actions of high frequency trading
firms during the turmoil as a part of their general investigation into the
Flash Crash. Yet in the 104 page formal report issued by the SEC and
the CFTC on September 30, 2010, HFT comprised relatively little of
their discussion. Interestingly, though, especially with respect to this
paper’s earlier discussion of the repeal of the original uptick rule, the
Report did find that the HFT firms were net sellers during the Flash
Crash.103
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After concluding their analysis of what had transpired during the
Flash Crash, the lawyers and politicians leading the SEC did not
aggressively pursue their investigation into HFT. Lewis suggests that the
dilatory response stemmed in part from the fact that over two hundred
former SEC staffers after the passage of Reg NMS had defected to work
for HFT firms or firms lobbying for HFT interests; thus, some previously
connected with the agency had a vested interest in maintaining the status
quo.104
Conceivably, too, SEC leaders and staff members might delay
additional regulatory action on the HFT front in the desire to avoid blame
for the situation. The imposition of new regulations (or the eradication of
some older ones) might suggest prior mistakes committed by the SEC.
Edward Kane, propounding the concept of a “regulatory dialect” in the
1980s, once explained that “The dialectical view portrays regulation as a
game of strategy with sequential moves.” He elaborated, “In responding
to changes in technology or regulation, individual moves are generally
freer and executed more quickly for regulated players and whatever less
regulated competitors exist than they are for the regulators
themselves.”105 Kane concluded that among regulators, self-regulators
react more quickly and with more freedom as compared to government
regulatory agencies. 106
While some might suggest that, with respect to HFT, the SEC has
succumbed to a case of blame avoidance 107 or regulatory capture, another
possibility is simply that government regulators lacked an intimate
understanding of how Wall Street was actually working. The SEC
chairmanship position has been overwhelmingly occupied by lawyers,
professors and politicians; only three of the 29 chairs since Kennedy
have come from the investing community, and a mere one of those
possessed actual trading experience. 108 If the SEC had a former stock
market insider as chair and if that chair brought more market savvy
professionals to work at the SEC, one wonders whether the agency
would have acted upon the concerns about the opacity of HFTs sooner
and more efficiently.
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Concluding Thoughts
Government regulators often are perceived as being slow and late in
addressing challenges posed by new technologies, and so to casual
observers, HFT might seem like another such case of regulatory lag.
Certainly, as Richard Scribner presciently noted in the mid 1980s, “By
increasing the speed, dispersion, and complexity of the marketplace,
…[technological] developments have introduced new challenges for the
regulator…” Scribner raised the question then of whether regulation
could “keep up” with “the technological revolution in securities trading,”
and the same question reverberates even more strongly today. 109 As
Scribner also noted, while technology has “sped trading” and impacted
the markets in many other ways, regulators also can resort to technology
to help them better monitor the evolving marketplace. 110
Lewis’ book has spurred calls for increased securities regulations to
prevent (or at least, more tightly control) high frequency trading. Yet that
is ironic, given that it was regulatory action, not lag, that helped create
the current state of affairs that is conducive to HFT. Perhaps that is one
of the key lessons here--that when well-intentioned regulators strive to
fix a perceived problem (in this case, the need to modernize the capital
markets and make them more fair), the remedy is often worse than the
disease. As Louis Kohlmeier Jr. explored in his 1969 seminal book The
Regulators, regulatory agencies in the United States have sometimes
erred as they have attempted to fulfill their tasks of protecting and
prioritizing the public interest. 111
In the case of the SEC, the agency promoted numerous regulations,
like Reg NMS, that have had often negative consequences. While
“unintended consequences” are a much-discussed problem stemming
from regulation, it has been theorized that perhaps the likely outcomes of
Regulation NMS had been understood by some and had been propelled
forward nevertheless by those who stood to benefit from the rise of HFT.
As Arnuk and Saluzzi speculate, “You can’t help but wonder whether the
changed market structure [over the last fifteen years] is less the result of
‘unintended consequences’ and more of a well-executed plan.”112
Surprising at least some observers, high frequency trading
proliferated after Reg NMS went into effect in 2007. Soon afterwards,
some market professionals and others sensed that HFTs were gaming the
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market. As Lewis notes, it was 2009—five years prior to the debut of
Lewis’ book and one year prior to the Flash Crash—when Senator
Charles Schumer formally complained to the SEC about flash trading. 113
In 2010, high frequency trading gained some negative attention in the
aftermath of the flash crash, but then the story somewhat faded from
popular view until the publication of Lewis’ book in 2014 catalyzed
concern.
Popular trust in the U.S. securities markets, perennially in short
supply, continues to be low, even as the stock market has rebounded
from the crash of 2008 and the flash crash of 2010. 114 Revelations of
HFT, along with other opaque practices like dark pools and the selling of
retail order flow to clandestine trading firms, have certainly stoked
additional mistrust and suspicion. 115 When such practices come to light,
these revelations shake people’s faith not just in brokerage firms, but also
in the market as a whole and in the capacity of the regulators to protect
the small, retail investor from such abuses. The public would be more
likely to trust the system if they trusted the regulators. 116 If the SEC
were led by someone not beholden to the system, and with the vision and
courage to breathe new life into an agency so it can better interpret and
enforce the laws we already have in place, instead of introducing new
ones, the staff jobs would start to attract premier talent. And with better,
not more, regulation, the public’s trust would be reestablished.
Anxious to accrue public trust in the market, New York State
Attorney General Eric Schneiderman has sensed the urgency of
investigating high frequency trading. While he readily acknowledges
that “High-frequency trading is with us. It’s not going away…,” he
emphasizes, “we have to make sure we have a set of laws and regulations
that send a message that everyone still has a fair shot to compete.” He
notes that “…the constant arms race of people having the incentive,
which they have now, to try untested methods to gain those extra
milliseconds of speed—that is a danger to the markets." 117
Perceiving a potentially simple solution to the problem, the founders
of alternate trading system IEX came to the realization that it would be
fairer if everyone had to go through a time delay before their trades were
placed in IEX’s matching engine. They contended that this would put
everyone on an equal footing and would eliminate the issue of some
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possessing more timely market information than others.118 Michael
Lewis, in his book and in interviews, has hailed IEX’s innovative
approach.119 Regardless of whether or not other trading venues could
similarly remove the time advantage currently enjoyed by high frequency
traders, the larger point here is that the solution to the HFT issue might
indeed emanate from the private sector, not the SEC.
In the meantime, HFT continues to wield enormous influence and
represent comparable risk, at least partly through its use of high
leverage.120 Decrying HFT, Michael Lewis has lamented the
deterioration in what “once been the world’s most public, most
democratic, financial market.” 121 Ironically, as this paper evidences, in
the SEC’s endeavor to make the stock market more fair by making it
more public and more democratic, a largely unforeseen outcome arose—
the birth of high frequency trading—the antithesis, to some, of a fair,
transparent, and open market.
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NOTES
1
Even more bluntly than in his book, Michael Lewis, in a 60 Minutes
Interview (2014) stated, “Stock market’s rigged. The U.S. stock market,
the most iconic market in global capitalism, is rigged.”
2
For another negative critique, see Scott Patterson, 2013. Notably,
however, there are defenders of both HFT and the overall fairness of
markets today. SEC Chair Mary Jo White, 2014, emphasized, “the
current market structure is not fundamentally broken, let alone rigged.”
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See Arnuk and Saluzzi, 2012, pp. 18-20; note especially their blunt
appraisal that “…the SEC is the creator of our Franken-Market.” p. 20.
See also Lewis, 2014, especially pp. 96-101, on Regulation NMS.
4
While we hail these factors as key, there are even more SEC-driven
factors also at play here driving HFT, such as the imposition of
Regulation ATS (alternate trading systems) in 1999 (mandating the
public display of quotes) and the elimination of Rule 390 in 2000 (which
meant member firms could now conduct transactions in NYSE-listed
stocks away from the floor of an organized exchange). On Rule 390’s
repeal, see Thomas Mulligan (1999). The NYSE eliminated Rule 390
with the SEC’s encouragement.
5
Definitions of HFT vary widely. See, for example, Edgar Perez, 2011,
pp. 2-4; also Arnuk and Saluzzi, 2012, especially pp. 24-26; Matthew
Philips (2013).
6
Kumiega quoted in Perez, p. 4.
7
In the 1970s, an early pioneer of algorithmic, computer-based trading
was Dean LeBaron at BatteryMarch Financial Management in Boston.
See Jason Zweig (2014).
8
See “Electronic trading platform,” “Algorithmic trading,” “Program
trading.” On ECNs, see R.T. Leuchtkafer (2012a, 155-158). When
ECNs debuted in 1997, the SEC encouraged the development, as the
SEC liked the idea of ECNs providing competition to especially the two
biggest exchanges, the NYSE and NASDAQ. (p. 155).
9
Latency has been defined as “the time it takes from when a trade is
started to when it’s executed” (Philips, 2012).
10
For more on HFT tactics, see Angel and McCabe, 2013, pp. 585-595.
11
Angel and McCabe (2013, p. 589), however, challenge this notion that
HFT allows certain privileged investors to acquire an advance look at
other traders’ orders without their knowledge or permission. If it is not a
look at actual order flow, however, it certainly does seem to us that HFT
traders, through various techniques, frequently obtain a look at potential,
likely order flow, through their predictive, anticipatory strategies.
12
See John McCain, S. Hrg. 213-413, Congress Session 113-2, June 17,
2014.
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In other words, physical proximity reduces latency. As Philips (2012)
explains, “The farther a signal has to travel, the higher the latency, which
is why a shorter cable is a faster cable.”
14
Several of the big HFT players are GETCO, Infinium, and Optiver.
Arnuk and Saluzzi, p. 24.
15
One such critic is brokerage firm founder Charles Schwab. See Nancy
Folbre, New York Times, April 7, 2014). Also see Charles Schwab
Corporation (2014); Kathleen Pender, San Francisco Chronicle, April
25, (2014).
16
In a sense, front running is a type of insider trading – insider trading on
order flow.
17
See also Angel and McCabe’s discussion of front-running (2013, p.
589).
18
According to Columbia University professor and Nobel laureate Joseph
Stiglitz, high-speed trading “results in sophisticated versions of front
running,” and hence has created “an unlevel playing field,” quoted in
Steve Matthews (2014). However, some disagree that HFT always, by its
inherent nature, constitutes front-running. See Caleb Johnson (2014).
19
Angel and McCabe (2013, p. 589).
20
Lewis (2014, p. 69).
21
After much intense debate, the final enacted bill was significantly
diluted from the Fletcher-Rayburn proposal. “Exchange Bill Passed…”
(1934, pgs. 1, 3). “Roosevelt Signs Curb Bill” (1934, p. 7).
22
SEC, “The Investor’s Advocate….”
23
Angel and McCabe (2013, p. 585) have insightfully inquired into the
meaning of “fair markets.”
24
Stock pools should not be confused with “dark pools.” Unlike dark
pools, which will be discussed later in this paper, stock pools are today
illegal. In a stock pool, a group of insiders grouped their money together
and tried through rumor spreading, “painting the tape,” and other
techniques to influence the price of the stock upward or downward,
agreeing to split the proceeds with each other after they pulled the plug
on the pool. For an interesting discussion of pools and how perhaps they
were not manipulatory, see Paul G. Mahoney, 1999, pp. 343-369.
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Felix Frankfurter assembled a team to craft the legislation that
included Benjamin Cohen, Thomas Corcoran, James Landis, and others.
26
NYSE President Richard Whitney, the leader of the Old Guard,
virulently opposed the proposed National Securities Act of 1934,
contending that the bill would seriously impair and possibly destroy the
market for stocks. See Whitney, various Statements February 22February 23, 1934, February 29, 1934, March 22, 1934, NYSE Archives.
See also “Exchange Supervisory Body Urged” (1934).
27
On Joseph Kennedy’s role as first chairman of the SEC, see Ralph
DeBedts, 1964; Ralph DeBedts, 1961, pp. 165-178; Joel Seligman, 1995.
28
For a discussion of the rationale underlying keeping the securities
industries primarily self-regulating, see Joel Seligman, 2004, p. 1347;
also see Seligman, 1995, p. 439.
29
Landis, June 19, 1935, quoted in Thomas McGraw, 1984, pp. 192-193.
See also SEC, First Annual Report, 1935, p. 38.
30
Douglas quoted in Chris Welles, 1975, p. 12.
31
Floor traders trade for their own accounts on the floor of the exchange;
specialists, tasked with making a market in each stock, under certain
conditions trade for their own accounts as well. In the 1970s, reporter
John Brooks (1999, pp. 91, 94-95) once described floor traders as “those
exchange members who play the market with their own money on the
floor itself, deriving from their membership the unique advantages over
nonmembers of being at the scene of action and of paying no
commissions to brokers.” Critical of the floor traders’ role, the 1963
Special Study of the Securities Market recommended (to no avail) that
floor traders “be legislated right out of existence through the interdiction
of their activities,” as Brooks explained. At roughly the same time, the
NYSE commissioned a study of floor trading which concluded that
eliminating floor trading would hurt liquidity and heighten stock
volatility.
32
Acting as a catalyst to bring buyers and sellers together is one of the
five key functions a specialist performs, according to the NYSE. The
other functions are “manage the auction process,” “execute orders for
floor brokers,” “provide capital,” and “stabilize prices.” NYSE,
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www.nyse.com. For simplicity sake, this paper consistently uses the
term “specialists,” though since 2008, the proper term is “designated
market makers” or DMMs, the new title reflecting some changes in the
position. See “Specialists are Transformed into Designated Market
Makers (DMMs),” (2008).
33
As Seligman (2004, p. 1350) explains, “Indeed, section 10 invited the
exchanges to go further and replace the specialists altogether with
exchange officers or employees who could perform ‘the functions of
specialists’ but would have no rights to trade for their own accounts.”
Also see Seligman, 1995, pp. 85-86.
34
“The NYSE and Nasdaq: How They Work,” Investopedia. Also see
“Auction Market,” Investopedia.
35
For a solid discussion of the historic role of specialists and market
makers and the lack of such intermediaries in the new electronic crossing
networks (ECNs) and HFT environment, see Leuchtkafer, 2012a, pp.
155-159.
36
Jay F. Coughneour and Daniel N. Deli, 2002, pp. 843-844. Also see
NYSE, Report of the Committee to Study the Stock Allocation System,
1976.
37
NYSE, www.nyse.com.
38
Maintaining a position in a stock, a specialist stands “prepared to buy
and sell from and to other members” and to the public, as stock market
historian Robert Sobel (1975, p. 16) once explained. See also Sobel, pp.
17-18. On the role of the specialist, also see Nicholas Wolfson and
Thomas A. Russo (1970, pp. 707-746); Kenneth M. Morris and Virginia
M. Morris (1999, p. 63); NYSE, www.nyse.com.
39
NYSE, www.nyse.com.
40
Specialists were essentially referees, although their calls were then
refereed by floor officials and potentially by the SEC.
41
NYSE Euronext quoted in Andrew Haigney (2010).
42
Interestingly, HFT defenders also invoke the same argument—that
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